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Cognitive theories of depression posit that automatically activated cognitive schemas, including 
negative thoughts about the self and the future, predispose individuals to develop depressive 
disorders. However, prior research has largely examined these constructs using explicit tests in 
currently depressed individuals. Using the Implicit Association Test (IAT), the present study 
examined automatic associations between the self and mood state (“depression IAT”) and between 
the future and mood state (“hopelessness IAT”) before and after a negative mood induction in 19 
remitted depressed individuals and 23 healthy controls.  In the depression IAT, remitted depressed 
participants exhibited an overall lower tendency to associate themselves with happiness relative to 
the healthy controls before the mood induction. Control, but not remitted depressed, participants’ 
automatic associations between the self and happiness diminished following the mood induction. 
Contrary to our hypotheses, no significant findings emerged when considering the hopelessness 
IAT. Consistent with prior studies, no significant correlations emerged between implicit and 
explicit biases, suggesting that these measures probe different processes. Results extend prior IAT 
research by documenting the presence of a reduced tendency to associate the self with happiness in 
a sample at increased risk for depression. 
Keywords: Depression; Cognitive Vulnerability; Affect; Implicit Association Test; Dysfunctional 
Attitudes.Two prominent theories of major depressive disorder (MDD) highlight cognitive diatheses that 
may confer increased vulnerability to depression.  According to Beck’s cognitive theory of 
depression, the activation of negative schemas about worthlessness, loss, and expected failure in 
response to a stressor, increases risk for depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). The 
hopelessness theory argues that the tendency to make stable, global, and internal attributions about 
unpleasant events should lead to pessimism about the future, which serves as a diathesis for 
depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). Importantly, both of these constructs are 
thought to exist among individuals in a non-depressed mood state, conferring vulnerability to 
depression when activated by a negative life event.
Although longitudinal studies represent the ideal tests of vulnerabilities, many studies 
examine populations at high-risk for future depressive episodes, including individuals who have 
experienced a depressive episode in the past, but are no longer depressed (e.g., remitted depressed 
(RD); see Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005, for a review). Consistent with the activation hypothesis 
(Teasdale, 1988), these studies indicate that negative cognitive biases emerge when RD individuals 
are induced into a transient negative mood (Miranda, Persons, & Byers, 1990), suggesting that the 
negative mood activates state-dependent vulnerabilities. Although this literature is compelling, these 
studies have generally emphasized explicit measures of negative cognitive styles, via self-report 
measures of dysfunctional attitudes, cognitive attributions, or effortful recall of valenced 
information (e.g., Segal, et al., 2006, Watkins, Grimm, Whitney, & Brown, 2005). It is unclear 
whether these biases operate at an implicit level, guiding automatic reactions to emotional stimuli, 
as hypothesized by several cognitive theories of depression (Beck et al., 1979; Beevers, 2005). 
Investigating implicit biases in RD populations is important given recent research suggesting that implicit and explicit measures may assess different components of cognitive processes (Beevers, 
2005; Haeffel et al., 2007), and that implicit measures may better predict distress and 
psychopathology than explicit measures (e.g., Nock & Banaji, 2007). 
One approach that shows promise for investigating implicit biases is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Originally designed to assess 
implicit prejudicial attitudes, the IAT measures the relative strength of participants’ automatic 
associations between pairs of concepts.  Responses to stimuli are hypothesized to be faster when 
the association between concepts is strong than when this link is weak. The IAT has been used 
recently to examine automatic implicit attitudes that may confer vulnerability in populations with 
psychopathology (e.g., Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001).
Only a small number of studies have used the IAT to assess negative cognitive styles in 
populations at risk for depression. Two recent reports assessed the degree to which undergraduate 
students associated words related to the self with pleasant versus unpleasant adjectives (defined as 
implicit self-esteem). The first indicated that negative implicit biases of self-esteem predicted 
distress following a laboratory stressor (Haeffel et al., 2007), whereas the second found that low 
positive implicit self-esteem interacted with recent stressful life events to predict depressive 
symptoms in undergraduates characterized by increased cognitive vulnerability to depression 
(Steinberg, Karpinki, & Alloy, 2007). Moreover, relative to healthy controls, RD participants 
displayed higher levels of positive implicit self-esteem (Franck, De Raedt, & De Houwer, in press; 
Gemar et al., 2001).  In both IAT studies, following a negative mood induction (MI), RD 
participants exhibited a significantly larger decrease in implicit self-esteem than controls; 
additionally, RD participants’ post-MI implicit bias was equivalent to that of the currently depressed samples (Franck et al., in press; Gemar et al., 2001). Although intriguing, interpretations 
of these findings were complicated by a lack of differences between RD and control participants’ 
post-MI implicit self-esteem (Franck et al., in press; Gemar et al., 2001). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that implicit biases may predict affective responses to stressors in the laboratory 
(Franck et al., in press; Gemar et al., 2001; Haeffel et al., 2007) as well as to self-reported life 
stressors (Steinberg et al., 2007). 
The IATs used in the aforementioned studies assessed implicit self-esteem, yet cognitive 
theories of depression (Abramson et al., 1989; Beck et al., 1979) suggest that negative cognitive 
styles about other concepts (e.g., the future) also confer vulnerability to depression. However, few 
studies have tested for the presence of these other implicit biases, and none have been with RD 
populations. One unpublished study documented increased implicit hopelessness in a sample of 
currently depressed individuals (Friedman et al., 2001); a second study noted correlations between 
increased tendency to associate the self with anxious and worry-related mood states and distress in 
response to a behavioral task designed to produce anxiety (Egloff & Schmukle, 2002). Therefore 
the goal of the present study was to extend the existing literature by investigating whether RD 
participants exhibit automatic tendencies to associate the self as well as the future with an 
unpleasant mood state before and after a MI. We hypothesized that: (1) RD participants would 
have smaller positive implicit biases compared to control participants, and that this differentiation 
would be greatest after the induction of a sad mood; (2) participant groups would show similar 
change in affect following the MI (Gemar et al., 2001); (3) RD participants, but not healthy 
controls, would display decreased positive implicit biases and increased dysfunctional attitudes 
after the MI (Franck et al., in press; Gemar et al., 2001; Segal et al., 1999; 2006); and (4) implicit and explicit measures of depression and hopelessness would not correlate given prior research 
indicating the independent natures of these measures (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; 
Gemar et al., 2001; Haeffel et al., 2007). 
Methods
Participants
Fifty-two participants, ages 18 – 55, were recruited from the greater Boston community.  
Participants were right-handed, native English speakers, with no self-reported neurological 
conditions, serious physical illness, or current Axis I diagnoses, as assessed using the Structured 
Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV, Patient Edition (SCID-I/P; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 
1995). Three RD participants had a history of past substance abuse at least a year prior to the 
study; no participants met criteria for a lifetime history of substance dependence.  Control 
participants had no lifetime history of any Axis I disorder.  
Twenty-eight healthy controls met inclusion criteria and participated in the study. Twenty-
four participants met criteria for RD, based on the National Institute of Mental Health guidelines 
(Birmaher, Ryan, & Williamson, 1996). Criteria for RD were assessed by responses to a self-
report measure and during the SCID interview and included each of the following: (1) having 
fewer than 2 symptoms of MDD at a subthreshold level (a 2 on the SCID) in the previous 2 
months, neither of which included depressed mood or anhedonia; (2) at least 1 major depressive 
episode within the last 10 years; and (3) Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & 
Ball, 1996) scores less than 14. No RD participant was taking psychotropic medications or herbal 
extracts (e.g., St. John’s Wort), or was receiving psychotherapy at the time of testing. For the RD 
sample, the mean number of prior MDE and the mean age of MDD onset were 2.94 (range: 1-10) and 20.12 (range: 11-28), respectively.1 
Four participants (2 RD, 2 controls) were excluded from analyses due to an insufficient 
number of correct trials on the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), three participants (1 RD, 2 controls) 
were excluded over concerns that they were not following instructions for the MI, two RD 
participants no longer met inclusion criteria on the day of testing (BDI-II > 14), and one control 
was excluded due to missing post-MI questionnaires.  Data from 42 participants (n = 19 RD, n = 
23 controls) were available for the analyses and are presented below. 
Measures 
Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT provides a measure of the strength of association 
between four categories by pairing two concept categories (e.g., Me/Not-Me) with two attribution 
categories (e.g., Happy/Sad; Greenwald et al., 1998). Based on the theory that pairing two similar 
categories is easier than pairing two dissimilar ones, the IAT effect is calculated by the amount of 
time that it takes for participants to categorize an exemplar.  The longer the response time, the 
weaker the presumed association is between two categories.  Reaction times were computed into a 
measure of effect size (D values) using the revised scoring algorithm, with larger D values 
indicating more positive bias (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). The IAT demonstrates 
acceptable internal consistency, reliability, and construct validity (Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek, 
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). Two IATs consisting of seven blocks of trials were used to measure 
implicit depression and implicit hopelessness.  Stimuli for both tasks were taken from similar IATs 
designed by Friedman and colleagues (2001; see Appendix).  
Mood Induction (MI). We implemented a standard MI procedure that has been used successfully with both healthy controls (Clark & Teasdale, 1985) and RD participants (Franck et al., in press; 
Gemar et al., 2001; Segal et al., 2006). Participants listened to a piece of music (the orchestral 
introduction to the film Alexander Nevsky, entitled “Russia Under the Mongolian Yoke”) played at 
one-quarter speed for eight minutes, while recalling a sad memory. 
Explicit Measures and Self-report Assessments of Mood
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). Participants rated their current mood using two 115-mm 
horizontal lines with the following bipolar dimensions: “happy/sad” and “relaxed/tense”. Prior 
research has demonstrated that the VAS is an expedient and reliable method of measuring 
participants’ mood state (Little & Crawford, 1973).
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS).  Participants also completed the state 
version of the PANAS, which contains two 10-item scales and has high internal consistency and 
reliability (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI – II). The revised 21-item version of the BDI was 
used to assess the severity of participants’ depressive symptoms and has acceptable test-retest 
reliability and high internal consistency (Beck, et al., 1996). 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS). The BHS was used as an explicit measure of participants’ 
hopelessness. This 20-item true/false scale has been found to possess acceptable reliability and 
high levels of construct validity (Beck & Weissman, 1974).
Spielberger’s State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S/STAI-T). The STAI was used to assess 
state and trait levels of anxiety, and has shown satisfactory psychometric properties (Spielberger, 
Gorush, & Luschene, 1970).  
Cognitive Styles Questionnaire (CSQ). The CSQ (Alloy et al., 2000) includes ratings for the likelihood and the personal relevance of 24 hypothetical negative and positive events. In the 
present study, this reliable and valid measure (Alloy et al., 2000) was used to assess participants’ 
cognitive beliefs about the projected impact of these events on their sense of self-worth and on the 
expected impact of the events in their future. 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS). The DAS, form A, was used to provide an explicit 
measure of maladaptive attitudes, including perfectionistic standards of performance, need for 
approval, and rigid ideas about the world (Weissman, 1979). The DAS contains 40 items which 
participants rate from 1 (totally agree) to 7 (totally disagree).  Higher scores on the DAS indicate 
greater levels of dysfunctional attitudes. 
Mood and Anxiety Questionnaire (MASQ). The 62-item version of the MASQ, a self-
report measure with satisfactory validity and reliability (e.g., Watson et al., 1995), was used to 
assess anxiety-specific symptoms (Anxious Arousal, AA), depression-specific symptoms 
(Anhedonic Depression, AD), and general distress (General Distress-Anxious Symptoms, GDA; 
General Distress-Depressive Symptoms, GDD). 
Procedure
All procedures met approval from Harvard University’s Institutional Review Board, and 
participants provided informed written consent after a study description.  Participants who qualified 
for the study were interviewed by trained advanced graduate students in clinical psychology or a 
licensed, masters-level clinical interviewer, using the SCID.  Interviewers received training on 
SCID administration through graduate coursework under the supervision of a licensed doctoral 
level clinical faculty member. For the present study, diagnostic reliability was established by 
randomly selecting 10 audiotaped SCID interviews. The interrater reliability for RD (κ = 1.00) and control (κ = 1.00) participants was excellent.  Eligible participants were scheduled for the computer 
session at a separate time and given the CSQ to take home and complete at least 24 hours prior to 
the experimental session. 
During this session, participants completed the pre-MI DAS before receiving instructions 
for the IAT task and completing one depression IAT and one hopelessness IAT (IAT order was 
counterbalanced across participants). Next, participants completed the PANAS and VAS, 
underwent the MI procedure, followed immediately by the completion of the PANAS, VAS, and a 
second depression IAT and hopelessness IAT in the same order as before. After the post-MI 
IATs, participants completed the PANAS, VAS, and remaining questionnaires (including a second 
administration of the DAS). Afterwards, participants viewed a brief amusing film clip to counteract 
any lingering effects of the MI.  Participants were then debriefed and compensated $15/hr for their 
time. The computer session lasted approximately one hour; total participation in the study lasted 
three to four hours.  
Statistical Analyses
Chi square tests and unpaired t-tests were used to examine group differences on 
demographic data (sex, ethnicity, age, education) and self-report measures (BDI, BHS, CSQ).  A 
MANOVA, with Group (Remitted, Control) and MASQ subscore (AA, AD, GDA, GDD) as 
multiple dependent variables, was performed to test for potential group differences in depressive 
and anxious symptoms. To test the effects of the MI on self-reported mood, 2 x 3 ANOVAs were 
performed separately for the VAS and PANAS using Group as the between-subjects factor and 
Time (pre-MI, post-MI, and post-IAT) as a repeated measure. An analogous Group x Time (pre-
MI, post-IAT) ANOVA was performed on the DAS score.  D values from each IAT were entered into separate 2 x 2 mixed ANOVAs using Group and Time (pre-MI, post-MI) as factors.  The 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was utilized when appropriate; significant ANOVA effects were 
followed up with post-hoc Newman-Keuls tests.
To assess the relation between implicit and explicit measures of negative biases, Pearson’s 
correlations were computed between (1) the changes scores (post-MI – pre-MI) for both the DAS 
and IAT scores; and (2) baseline CSQ and the IAT changes scores (unlike the DAS, the CSQ was 
administered only once). Correlational analyses were performed for each group separately. Overall, 
two-tailed p-values are reported.
Results
Sociodemographic and self-reported mood data 
Demographic and self-reported mood data are presented in Table 1. Groups did not differ 
with respect to sex, ethnicity, age, or education. Groups also did not differ in their MASQ scores, 
as assessed by multivariate testing using the Hotelling's criterion, F(4, 37) = 1.45, p  > 0.23, partial 
η2 = 0.136). RD participants reported significantly higher scores on the BDI-II, BHS, STAI-S, 
and STAI-T (all ps < 0.04; see Table 1) as well as a trend for higher levels of negative cognitive 
styles on the CSQ, t(40) = -1.93, p < 0.07. 
Mood Manipulation Check
VAS mood. The MI successfully lowered participants’ mood, Time, F(2, 80) = 79.17, p  < 
0.01, partial η2 = 0.67. Post-hoc tests indicated that the lowest levels of happiness occurred after 
the MI (41.63±19.64), with intermediate levels at the post-IAT assessment (55.85±18.95), and the 
highest levels of happiness before the MI (70.95±14.48) (post-MI > post-IAT > pre-MI; all ps < 0.005). Thus, a significant decrease in happiness was observed immediately after the MI, which 
persisted until the post-IAT assessment, albeit in a lessened form. There was a nonsignificant trend 
for RD participants to report overall lower levels of happiness than controls, Group, F(1, 40) = 
3.36, p < 0.07; the Group x Time interaction was not significant, F(2, 80) = 1.76, p > 0.15.
VAS tension. A significant main effect of Time, F(2, 74) = 8.16, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.18, 
emerged due to significantly higher tension at the post-MI (43.27±24.42) compared with the post-
IAT (30.08±18.27) and pre-MI (30.50±18.16) assessments (both ps < 0.01). No differences 
emerged between the post-MI and post-IAT assessments (p > 0.20). Additionally, RD participants 
(46.39±3.83) reported significantly overall higher tension scores than controls (31.62±3.37), 
Group, F(1, 37) = 8.40, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.19. The Group x Time interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 74) = 1.13, p > 0.30, partial η2 = 0.03. 
PANAS NA. The only reliable finding was the main effect of Time, F(2, 80) = 14.41, p < 
0.01, partial η2 = 0.26, due to significantly higher NA scores following the MI (14.52±6.29) as 
compared with both the pre-MI (10.93±1.35) and post-IAT (11.93±3.57) assessments (both ps < 
0.005). The main effect of Group and the Group x Time interaction were not significant, F(1, 40) 
= 3.74, p > 0.06, partial η2 = 0.09, and F(2, 80) = 1.76, p > 0.15, partial η2 = 0.04, respectively.  
PANAS PA. As above, the main effect of Time was significant, F(2, 80) = 36.85, p < 0.01, 
partial η2 = 0.48, as participants reported lower PA scores at the post-MI (20.07±8.76) compared 
to both the pre-MI (26.40±8.72) and post-IAT (21.98±9.16) assessments, which in turn differed from each other (all ps < 0.02). This effect was qualified by a nearly significant Time x Group 
interaction, F(2, 80) = 2.91, p = 0.07, partial eta2 = 0.07. This trend was followed-up with post-
hoc tests; no group differences emerged. The main effect of Group was not significant, F(1, 40) = 
1.50, p > 0.20, partial η2 = 0.04.  
Effects of MI on explicit measures 
A main effect of Time, F(1, 40) = 8.34, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.17, emerged due to 
significantly higher DAS scores after the MI relative to the pre-MI assessment (Figure 1).  The 
main effect of Group, F(1, 40) = 2.31, p > 0.10, partial η2 = 0.06, and the Group x Time 
interaction, F(1, 40) = 0.56, p > 0.40, partial η2 = 0.01, were non-significant.  
Effects of MI on implicit measures 
Depression IAT. Significant main effects of Time, F(1, 40) = 13.40, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 
0.25 and Group, F(1, 40) = 8.70, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.18, were qualified by a Group x Time 
interaction, F(1, 40) = 4.08, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.09. Post-hoc tests clarified that, compared to 
control participants, RD participants reported lower D scores (indicating lower positive bias) both 
before (p < 0.0004) and after (p < 0.03) the MI. Contrary to our hypothesis, control (p < 0.0001) 
but not RD (p > 0.25) participants showed a significant reduction in this bias after the MI (Figure 
2a).  
Although RD participants reported anxiety and depression symptoms below clinical 
significance (Table 1), BDI, BHS, and STAI scores were significantly higher than those of control participants. Consequently, hierarchical regression analyses were performed to determine if group 
differences in pre-MI depression IAT scores remained after factoring out the variance accounted 
for by depression, anxiety, and hopelessness.  To this end, BDI, BHS, STAI-S, and STAI-T 
scores were simultaneously entered in the first step of the model, followed by the variable Group 
(dummy-coded). Self-reported measures did not predict depression IAT scores (all |βs| < 0.18; all |
ts| < 0.87, all ps > 0.35). Critically, Group was a significant predictor of pre-MI depression IAT 
scores (β = 0.54; t = 3.35, p < 0.002), even after accounting for differences in baseline symptoms 
(ΔR2 = 0.23, ΔF(2, 39) = 11.20, p < 0.003).2 A second (control) hierarchical regression analysis 
was performed to account for the increased tension levels reported by RD participants. As above, 
Group remained a significant predictor of pre-MI IAT scores, even after accounting for initial 
tension levels, ΔR2 = 0.26, ΔF(1, 35) = 12.74, p < 0.01. 
Hopelessness IAT. As with the depression IAT, both groups displayed a bias towards 
associating the future with happiness. Contrary to our hypotheses, the effects of Time, F(1, 40) = 
1.16, p > 0.20, partial η2 = 0.03, and Group, F(1, 40) = 2.78, p > 0.10, partial η2 = 0.07, and the 
Group x Time interaction, F(1,40) = 0.03, p > 0.80, partial η2 = 0.001, were not significant.
Relationship between implicit and explicit measures
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Bosson, et al., 2000; Gemar et al., 2001; Haeffel et al., 
2007), no significant correlations emerged between implicit and explicit measures for either group 
(Table 2). However, for both RD and control participants, respectively, the two IATs were 
positively correlated with each other both before (r = 0.46, p < 0.07; r = 0.42, p < 0.05) and after (r = 0.38, p < 0.01; r = 0.42, p < 0.04) the MI, indicating that greater tendencies to associate the 
future with happiness were linked to greater tendencies to associate the self with happiness.
Discussion
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate implicit depression and 
implicit hopelessness concurrently among RD individuals.  Results from the current study suggest 
that RD individuals are characterized by a reduced and state-independent tendency to associate the 
self with positive mood state words relative to healthy controls. Accordingly, whereas healthy 
controls experienced a decrease in their tendency to associate the self with happiness after a MI, 
RD participants’ reduced implicit bias was not affected by a worsening of their mood. These 
effects were not related to current levels of self-reported anxiety, depression, tension, or 
hopelessness. Contrary to our hypotheses, the RD individuals exhibited an equivalent tendency to 
associate the future with happiness as control participants; moreover, this bias was unaffected by 
the MI.
Depression IAT
The reduced tendency to associate the self with happiness among RD participants prior to 
the MI extends prior research investigating implicit biases in at-risk population, including studies 
suggesting that low implicit self-esteem in undergraduates predicted increased distress after a 
laboratory stressor (Haeffel et al., 2007) and higher depression symptoms following life stressors 
(Steinberg et al., 2007).  Further, findings from the present study contrast with prior findings of 
greater positive implicit self-esteem to controls prior to and equivalent implicit self-esteem 
following a MI in two RD samples (Franck et al., in press; Gemar et al., 2001). As implicit biases 
are thought to guide immediate reactions to stressors (Beevers, 2005), and positive self-ideation is posited to serve as a protective factor (Taylor & Armor, 1996), a reduced tendency to view the self 
as happy or as a worthwhile person may increase the likelihood of developing explicit negative 
cognitive styles and depressive symptoms following a stressor. More generally, the present 
findings of reduced positive implicit bias provide important empirical evidence in support of 
theoretical arguments that have emphasized links between MDD and deficits in an approach-related 
system promoting positive affect (e.g., Depue & Iacono, 1989; Pizzagalli, Jahn, & O’Shea, 2005; 
Watson & Clark, 1984).
However, the finding of reduced positive bias in RD participants prior to the MI is 
inconsistent with prior studies. First, although a limited number of IAT studies exist in RD 
samples, baseline implicit self-esteem bias scores have been found to be more positive than those 
of healthy controls and decrease following a MI (e.g., Franck et al., in press; Gemar et al., 2001); 
only one prior study has found differences between individuals at high and low cognitive risk for 
MDD without an MI (Steinberg et al., 2007). Second, information processing studies have 
frequently failed to document baseline negative biases among RD samples without the use of a MI 
or stressor (Miranda et al., 1990). Finally, recent research indicates that self-esteem instability 
places individuals at risk for depressive episodes (Franck & De Raedt, 2007); as such, significant 
changes in bias scores following the MI would have been expected in the current RD sample. 
One possible explanation for the stability of the RD participants’ implicit biases is that 
implicit tendencies to view the self as being happy are more stable and less affected by transient 
mood as compared with other self-concepts.  Whereas prior studies examined implicit self-esteem, 
a construct consisting of global statements about the self using stimuli such as Valuable/Worthless 
(e.g., successful, incompetent; De Raedt et al., 2006) or Positive/Negative (e.g., trustworthy, quarrelsome; Gemar et al., 2001), the present study assessed the degree to which individuals 
associated themselves with depressed or positive mood and used the stimulus category Happy/Sad 
(e.g., cheerful, gloomy). While self-esteem is explicitly contained in the negative schemas from 
Beck’s (1979) cognitive theory, associations of mood with the self are linked to negative cognitive 
schemas as components of an individual’s self-concept. Although implicit self-esteem may contain 
an emotional component related to mood state, implicit depression, as tested in the present study, is 
solely concerned with mood. Therefore, performance differences in these two implicit tasks may 
reflect the specificity of our task relative to the broader construct tapped in self-esteem IATs. Given 
the literature reporting increased implicit self-esteem in RD compared to healthy participants prior 
to a MI, the current findings warrant further investigation. 
Alternatively, given prior research noting that changes in dysfunctional attitudes in 
response to a MI (Segal et al., 2006) or unstable self-esteem in response to daily stressors (Franck 
& De Raedt, 2007) predicted increase in depressive symptoms, the relative stability of implicit and 
explicit measures in the current study may indicate that our RD sample might be less susceptible to 
relapse. However, if RD participants’ reduced tendency toward associating the self with happiness 
is resistant to negative affective fluctuations, it might be equally unaffected by positive mood states 
(e.g., joy); such a lack of reactivity may further strengthen associations between the self and 
sadness.  Finally, RD participants’ lack of change on the depression IAT may be due to a floor 
effect. Their diminished positive biases may have been unable to be further reduced by such a brief 
stressor; in contrast, control participants’ higher positive associations may have had more ability to 
vary in the presence of a brief negative mood. Future studies testing these hypotheses, particularly 
in a larger sample with a wide range of remission durations, are warranted.    Hopelessness IAT
Contrary to our hypotheses, as well as Abramson and colleague’s (1989) hopelessness 
theory, both participant groups showed an implicit bias toward associating the future with 
happiness, and RD individuals did not exhibit a greater tendency to view the future as less happy 
than control participants, even after a MI. The lack of significant findings is surprising, particularly 
in light of previous research that found biases towards implicit hopelessness in currently depressed 
individuals (Friedman, et al., 2001), increased levels of explicit hopelessness in healthy controls 
after a negative MI (Hepburn, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2006), and the overall increased implicit 
depression in the same population (current study).  However, the MI procedure in the present 
study included an autobiographical component (“think of a sad memory”). Unintentional priming 
of associations between the past and sadness may have occurred, leading to a decreased ability to 
detect an implicit hopelessness bias because the IAT scoring paradigm used relies on the 
juxtaposition of opposing sets of pairings. In addition, because the IAT was designed to assess 
participants’ associations between the future and pleasant or unpleasant mood states, it may have 
not adequately tapped into the attributions that are hypothesized to play a key role in the 
hopelessness theory of depression. According to the hopelessness theory, individuals may develop 
pessimistic views of the future when they make global, stable, and internal attributions about 
negative life events (Abramson et al., 1989). Consequently, as implicit measures tap automatic 
associations, it is possible that future research using an IAT assessing RD participants’ tendency to 
associate negative events with these attributional categories would demonstrate the predicted 
implicit biases. 
Explicit Measures  Unlike prior studies (Gemar et al., 2001; Segal et al., 1999; Segal et al., 2006), remitted 
individuals did not exhibit heightened levels of dysfunctional attitudes relative to healthy controls 
throughout the study, although both groups displayed increased dysfunctional attitudes after the 
MI. One possibility for these findings among the remitted sample is that in prior studies the DAS 
was administered shortly (~5 min) after the MI, whereas in the present paradigm, participants 
completed the two IATs (~10 min) and mood assessments (~2 min) before completing the DAS.  
Mood ratings taken at the end of these IATs indicated that participants’ negative mood had partially 
dissipated by this time, and therefore the failure to detect DAS changes between groups may be the 
result of a relatively less powerful negative mood than was achieved in prior studies. Furthermore, 
prior studies have used two forms of the DAS to test for pre- and post-MI differences (e.g., Gemar 
et al., 2001; Segal et al., 2006), while the present study used the same form before and after the MI. 
This may have reduced our ability to detect changes in dysfunctional attitudes, which represents an 
important limitation of the present study. 
Finally, although no significant differences were found between participant groups on the 
CSQ, remitted depressed participants displayed a trend for increased negative cognitive styles on 
the CSQ relative to control participants. This trend is consistent with major theories of depression 
(Beck et al., 1979; Abramson et al., 1989). 
Limitations and Conclusions
The limitations of the present study should be acknowledged.  First, the MI induced both a 
sad mood and increased levels of tension, with an observed trend towards greater tension among 
remitted participants.  Moreover, the remitted sample reported greater levels of explicit anxiety, 
hopelessness, and depression than control participants. Although several regression analyses indicated that group uniquely predicted implicit bias scores after accounting for the variance 
associated with these ratings, future studies examining the potential moderating role of self-
reported anxiety, tension, hopelessness, and depression in these populations are warranted. 
These limitations notwithstanding, the present study provides initial evidence that a reduced 
and stable automatic tendency to associate the self with happiness may be a distinguishing feature 
of individuals at increased vulnerability for MDD. Future studies should examine whether this bias 
is modulated by pleasant mood states, length of the remission period, and/or treatment history (e.g., 
cognitive-behavioral therapy vs. antidepressants; Segal et al., 2006), and whether this bias predicts 
future depressive episodes. If predictive, these measures may be incorporated into clinical settings 
as a more objective measure of attitudes than current self-report questionnaires.  References
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1. Data on number of prior MDE and mean age of MDD onset were unavailable for six of the 
24 remitted depressed participants.
2. To investigate the potential effects of multicollinearity between anxiety measures, 
hierarchical regression analyses were performed, which entered only one anxiety measure, 
the STAI-S, as a covariate along with the BDI, BHS, simultaneously in the first step and 
Group (Remitted, Control) in the second.  Importantly, Group remained a significant 
predictor of pre-MI depression IAT scores (β = 0.53; t = 3.47, p < 0.001), even after 
accounting for differences in baseline symptoms (ΔR2 = 0.22, ΔF(1, 35) = 12.03, p < 
0.001). Similar results were found when the STAI-T or the MASQ was used instead of the 
STAI-S.Appendix
Stimuli for Depression IAT:
I, Me, Self, Myself, Mine, They, Them, Their, Theirs, Other, Depressed, Helpless, 
Hopeless, Gloomy, Withdrawn, Smiling, Glad, Cheerful, Joyful, Delighted.
Stimuli for Hopelessness IAT:
Years Ahead, Days Ahead, Tomorrow, Next Week, Next Year, Yesterday, Last 
Year, Last Week, Days Ago, Years Ago, Smiling, Glad, Cheerful, Joyful, Delighted, 
Depressed, Helpless, Hopeless, Gloomy, Withdrawn.  Table 1: Summary of sociodemographic and self-report measures.
________________________________________________________________________
      Control                     Remitted Statistics p-value
    Mean (SD)              Mean (SD)
________________________________________________________________________
n       23                19
Age    27.70 (9.02)             26.00   (7.44) t(40) = 0.63 > 0.53
Sex (M/F)      3/20                            1/18 χ2(1) = 0.73 > .0.39
Age of onset      N/A              20.12
Prior episodes      N/A   2.94     
In remission (yrs)  N/A   4.10    (3.56)   
Education   16.22    (1.85)              15.95    (1.89) t(40) = 0.47 > 0.60
BDI-II     1.35    (2.31)   3.37    (3.32) t(40) = -2.24 < 0.04
BHS     1.48    (1.44)   3.78    (4.02)  t(40) = -6.49 < 0.01
STAI-S     32.22    (7.10)             39.95  (12.59)  t(40) = -2.99 < 0.01
STAI-T   33.78    (8.41)             42.42  (10.29)  t(40) = -2.38 < 0.03
MASQAA   18.61    (2.73) 18.74   (2.45) F(4,37) = 1.45 > 0.23* 
MASQAD   46.30  (13.22) 54.95   (9.50) F(4,37) = 1.45 > 0.23*
MASQGDA   14.57   (4.35) 16.47   (4.09) F(4,37) = 1.45 > 0.23* 
MASQGDD   16.22   (6.34) 19.53   (6.85)  F(4,37) = 1.45 > 0.23* 
CSQneg     3.71   (0.83)              4.27   (1.01)  t(40) = -1.93 < 0.07
CSQpos                  4.69  (0.50)    4.80  (0.52)  t(40) = -0.68 > 0.50
________________________________________________________________________
Note : BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory – II; BHS: Beck Hopelessness Scale; STAI-S: Spielberger 
State/Trait Anxiety Inventory – State; STAI-T: Spielberger State/Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait; 
MASQ: Mood and Anxiety State Questionnaire; AA: Anxious Arousal; AD: Anhedonic Depression; 
GDA: General Distress-Anxious Symptoms; GDD: General Distress-Depressive Symptoms; CSQneg: 
Cognitive Styles Questionnaire negative subscale; CSQpos: Cognitive Styles Questionnaire positive subscale. *No group differences emerged from the multivariate test (Hotelling’s criterion).
Table 2: Summary of Pearson’s correlations between implicit and explicit measures for remitted 
depressed (n = 19) and control (n = 23) participants.
_________________________________________________________________________
Δ Depression IAT           Δ Hopelessness IAT 
________________________________________________________________________
Δ DAS  Controls r = 0.26 (ns) r = -0.14 (ns)
Remitted  r = 0.41 (p = 0.085) r = -0.25 (ns)
CSQneg Controls  r = 0.33 (ns) r = 0.004 (ns)
Remitted  r = 0.22 (ns) r = 0.18 (ns)
CSQpos Controls  r = 0.19 (ns) r = 0.006 (ns)
Remitted  r = 0.26 (ns) r = 0.12 (ns)
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Δ Depression IAT = (post-MI Depression IAT) – (pre-MI Depression IAT); 
Δ Hopelessness IAT = (post-MI Hopelessness IAT) – (pre-MI Hopelessness IAT); Δ DAS = 
(post-MI DAS) – (pre-MI DAS). DAS: Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; CSQneg: Cognitive Styles 
Questionnaire negative subscale; CSQpos: Cognitive Styles Questionnaire positive subscaleFigure legends
Figure 1: Mean DAS scores. Higher scores indicate greater levels of dysfunctional attitudes. DAS: 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale. Error bars indicate standard errors.
Figure 2: Mean D values (and S.E.) for the (a) Depression IAT and (b) Hopelessness IAT.  The 
more positive the D value, the higher the positive bias towards the self and the future, respectively. 
IAT: Implicit Association Test. Error bars indicate standard errors.Figure 1
 Figure 2
 